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1 
Abstract 
Property ownership is a cornerstone of the Western legal tradition. Over the 
years it has become one of the basic rights in a given society, especially for the 
so-called rule-of-law countries, due to the fact that it has a great impact on the 
rights of every citizen. 
Nevertheless, property law also has an influence on economic growth and 
the case of China is pivotal. Paying particular attention to property rights relat-
ed to land, this paper critically traces the legal evolution of property law in 
China and underlines its controversial aspects and the assistance that people’s 
courts could guarantee to potentially solve some of the issues related to proper-
ty. 
2 
1. Introduction 
In the aftermath of Mao Zedong’s death, the People’s Republic of China expe-
rienced unprecedented economic growth together with a massive process of 
legal reform. The aim of this paper is to reconstruct the complex legal devel-
opments which have accompanied the unprecedented economic growth in the 
last decades, explore the impact of these developments on some particular as-
pects of the legal-economic context, and shed some light on the role Chinese 
Courts could play in solving related issues. 
The paper is divided into four main parts. First, I will compare the Western 
and Chinese legal traditions regarding the concept and function of property. 
Second, I will critically investigate the complex legislative developments in 
judicial reform in the post-Mao period which have contributed to shaping the 
Chinese legal system. Third, I will focus on the evolution of property rights in 
China, looking at the development of the most relevant constitutional articles 
and of the pertinent legislation. Finally, I will discuss the potential role of the 
judiciary in interpreting and implementing these rules in order to contribute to 
establishing a virtuous circle between the people’s trust in the legal system, a 
reliable judiciary and sustainable economic growth. 
2. General Assumptions of Property Law: A Comparison  
Between the Western Legal Tradition and the Chinese  
Legal System 
In the civil law tradition, the concept of property could be compared to a Jack-
in-a-box. When closed up in the box, Jack provides little enjoyment, but open-
ing the box and letting Jack spring out gives full enjoyment. This is similar to 
an owner of property having to respect third-party rights (the so-called real 
rights concept) to his property (i.e. sharing it with others), while giving full 
ownership to the owner is like removing these real rights and ensuring, there-
fore, the right of the owner to exclude others and fully enjoy his/her property. 
The theory was well-summarized in article 544 of the French Civil Code of 
1804 (the Napoleonic Code), which is the basis of the civil law tradition and 
therefore of most European/continental civil codes. Article 544 states “La 
propriété est le droit de jouir et disposer des choses de la manière la plus 
absolue, pourvu qu’on n’en fasse pas un usage prohibé par les lois ou par les 
règlements.” To understand the impact of this concept over the centuries it is 
sufficient to look through the French Civil Code’s table of contents and see 
that property and freedoms – for instance contractual freedom – were and still 
are the core concepts of this legal text. In fact, two of the three (now four) 
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books of the Napoleonic Code are dedicated to different aspect of ownership. 
The second book of the French Civil Code is entitled “Des Biens, et des diffé-
rentes modifications de la propriété,” and the third one “Des différentes 
manières dont on acquiert la propriété.” Understanding the different ways of 
modifying or acquiring ownership allows a better understanding of the rela-
tionship between the notion of ownership and that of free will. This relation-
ship, in particular with regard to contractual freedom, can be clarified by ana-
lysing the economic function of property. Generally speaking, the possibility 
of privately owning and exchanging things is the basis of trade, and indeed of 
the whole economy.  
The reason why property rights played and still play an important role in a 
given society is therefore their strong association with economic growth. In 
particular, selling, borrowing, lending and establishing real rights over private 
property is one of the key elements of economic growth, and actors usually 
feel safer and more willing to do business where a general and understandable 
theory of property rights exists and is protected and implemented fairly.1 Con-
tracts are usually the means by which goods and the rights related to these 
goods circulate within or between societies, while the court system assures 
contractual stability. Indeed, property law became enshrined in the continental 
constitutions adopted for the most part in the post-Second World War period.2 
Taking into account the interest of the state in this matter, it is easy to un-
derstand that each country has an interest in protecting people’s property 
rights. By and large, the Western legal tradition relies on a well-established 
system of property rights with private property as the core element, and puts 
trust in the protection of these rights in the hands of an independent court sys-
tem (at least in theory). By doing so, each state attempts to satisfy both the so-
cial and the economic functions of property law. 
Property law, therefore, seems strictly connected to the court system, and 
for the so-called developing countries the instrumentality of property rights in 
achieving economic growth is deemed to require political change enabling the 
establishment of an independent judicial power.3 
                                                 
1 An interesting collection of articles can be found in Epstein, RA (Ed) (2007) Eco-
nomics of Property Law, Edward Elgar Publishing. 
2 For instance, Article 41 of the Italian Constitution (1948); Article 34 of the French 
Constitution (1958); Article 14 of the Basic Law of the Federal Republic of Germa-
ny (1949).  
3 Peerenboom, R (2004) ‘Varieties of rule of law: an introduction and provisional 
conclusion’ in Peerenboom, R (ed) (2004) Asian Discourses of Rule of Law, 
Routledge 1. 
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China’s unprecedented growth was unexpected for several reasons. First of 
all, for a socialist country focused on public ownership, conventional wisdom 
saw such growth as basically impossible. Second, even though public and col-
lective ownership were considered the basis of China’s socialist economic sys-
tem, the country lacked a clear theory of property rights. Finally, China lacked 
legal institutions and a class of legal professionals, especially in the wake of 
the Cultural Revolution (1966-1976). China seemed, therefore, to lack the en-
vironment usually perceived necessary for economic growth, or at least for 
lasting economic growth. 
However, the Chinese legal system, which is often considered young and 
inconsistent, seems able to completely overturn some of the Western certain-
ties. Several circumstances would seem to have helped China’s unprecedented 
economic growth. In fact, interestingly, it has been argued that it was precisely 
the absence, or rather the vagueness, of a detailed definition of property law 
rights and the lack of a competent independent professional judiciary that 
formed the basis for this growth.4 With foreign investment playing a dominant 
role in China’s growth, the advantages of doing business in China were so 
massive that the risks associated with the weak protection of property rights 
were ignored. While this is certainly true, it is also true that the situation was to 
the detriment of Chinese workers, whose civil rights, and in particular property 
rights, remained more often than not totally unprotected. 
China’s growth also challenged the idea that actors (especially foreign 
businessmen) feel safer where a general doctrine of property rights and their 
protection exist. What is plausible is that Western investment, especially at the 
beginning of China’s ‘open-door policy,’ took advantage of this situation. It 
was not until 2007 that the National People’s Congress of the People’s Repub-
lic of China formally adopted the Real Rights Law (also known as the Property 
Law), which officially puts the protection of private property on a par with that 
of state/public and collective property, the fundamental pillar of a socialist 
country like China.5  
This emblematic change has been considered by many to be a historical 
shift and a great step forward in ‘China’s Long March Toward Rule of Law.’6 
This march, which on paper started in 1999 after the third Chinese constitu-
tional amendment, was in fact preceded by other legal reforms.7 It is plausible 
                                                 
4 Upham FK (2009) ‘Chinese Property Rights and Property Theory’ in Vol. 39 Hong 
Kong Law Journal pp. 611-625, at p. 612.  
5 Real Rights Law of the People’s Republic of China, 2007 art. 39. 
6 The expression derives from the title of the book by Peerenboom, R (2002) China’s 
Long March Toward Rule of Law, Cambridge University Press. 
7 Article 5 of the 1982 Chinese Constitution after its amendment in 1999 states: ‘The 
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that the perceived imminence of such political and legal changes facilitated 
foreign investment. Looking at the whole Chinese legal context, it is possible 
to discern that the fast economic growth has been accompanied by a parallel 
legal reform, which over the last decades has become significant and which 
directly involved the main pillars of the legal system, and indirectly helped the 
economic escalation. 
3. China’s Unprecedented Economic Growth and the  
Reform of the Legal System 
In the aftermath of the so-called ‘legal nihilism’ of the Cultural Revolution 
(1966-1976), China’s new leadership was quick to distance itself from the ex-
cesses of Mao’s policies, declaring a new role for law. Law was considered 
necessary to rule the country, a necessary tool to ‘open the door’ to the rest of 
the world and transform communist China into a world power in the first stage 
of socialism. Under the catchphrase “I don’t care if it’s a white cat or a black 
cat. It’s a good cat as long as it catches mice,” Deng Xiaoping’s pragmatism 
laid the basis for China’s growth. 
Nevertheless, the legacy of the previous leadership was still to be noticed. 
Pivotal principles such as democratic centralism and the dual dependence sys-
tem remained (and still remain) fundamental. According to these principles, 
there is a need for centralisation in the administration to be replicated at all 
sub-administrative levels, allowing the National People’s Congress and its 
Standing Committee at the national level and the Local People’s Congresses 
and their respective Standing Committees at the local level to appoint and dis-
miss people in leading positions, for instance Court presidents and ordinary 
judges. In doing so they take account of political loyalty, or at least make sure 
that candidates are acceptable to the Party, which continues to give the lead. 
The dual dependence system basically means that control is not only exercised 
‘top-down’ from the national level to the local level and within the people’s 
congress or the court system, but also horizontally, meaning that at each level 
the people’s congress exercises control over the court at the same level. This is 
based on the principle that a people’s congress is, at least in theory, the voice 
of the people.8 
                                                                                                                                                     
People’s Republic of China governs the country according to law and makes it a so-
cialist country under rule of law.’ 
8 See the Preamble and articles 2, 62, 63, and 67 of the Constitution of the People’s 
Republic of China; and Van Rooijj, B (2002) ‘Appendix II China’s System of Public 
Administration,’ in Chen, J, Li Yuwen and Otto, JM (eds) (2002) Implementation of 
Law in the People’s Republic of China, Kluwer Law International. 
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In the first 20-25 years, Chinese reform was mainly a top-down affair, even 
if, due to the country’s size and its complicated administrative stratification, 
some reform experiments were tried out in practice before being codified.9 The 
case of China is emblematic, even though it is common knowledge that legal 
reforms usually lag behind economic development. One of the first laws enact-
ed concerned equity joint ventures (1979), a clear indication that legal reform 
was to play a key role in facilitating economic growth. Providing instruments 
such as a legal basis to create Sino-foreign joint ventures and wholly foreign-
owned companies was a clear indication of a dominant intention to build a 
well-functioning investment system rather than establish a comprehensive le-
gal system.10 
Other parts of the new legislation were indirectly involved in such growth. 
For instance, the effort invested in rebuilding the court system, its procedural 
rules, and the legal professions was aimed at building a more trustworthy legal 
system more in line with international standards. Nevertheless, the reforms 
were also indirectly helpful in promoting economic growth, as a legal system 
worthy of its name can be considered instrumental in attracting foreign inves-
tors. In this regard, its provisions could also compete in shaping China’s legal 
system and to a certain extent state behaviour.11 
The perceived importance of legality, together with Deng’s pragmatism, 
saw many other laws being enacted in the following years with twofold results: 
on the one hand they encouraged economic growth with specific legislation, 
and on the other hand they were building a comprehensive and reliable legal 
system. As far as the latter result is concerned, the judicial institutions – and 
consequently a class of professional jurists – needed to be re-built after having 
been closed down during the Great Revolution. Prior to the adoption of the 
current Constitution in 1982, explicitly declared to be the country’s supreme 
law, the Organic Law of the People’s Courts (OLPC) came into force in 1979 
and established the overall structure of the Chinese court system, underlining 
the principle of judicial independence.12 In accordance with Article 3 of the 
                                                 
9 Heilmann, S (2011) ‘Policy-Making through Experimentation: The Formation of a 
Distinctive Policy Process’ in Heilmann, S and Perry, EJ (eds) (2011) Mao’s Invisi-
ble Hand. The Political Foundations of Adaptive Governance, Harvard University 
Press 62. 
10 Lubman, SB (1999) Bird in a Cage. Legal Reform in China after Mao, Stanford 
University Press at 192. 
11 Liebman, BL (2011) ‘A Return to Populist Legality? Historical Legacies and Legal 
Reform,’ in Heilmann, S and Perry, EJ (eds) (2011) supra n 9 at 165. 
12 Article 4, Organic Law of People’s Courts 1979 (amended in 1993 and 2006). In 
reality, these laws were not completely new. The first period of Mao’s leadership 
had seen enactments of laws inherited from the Kuomintang period, mainly based on 
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OLPC, the task of people’s courts is inter alia to uphold the socialist legal sys-
tem and public order and to educate citizens in loyalty to their socialist mother-
land and respect for the Constitution and the law.13 
Another indication of the importance of legality at that time was the 1989 
enactment of the Administrative Procedure (or Litigation) Law, which had the 
stated purpose of  
“safeguarding correct and timely adjudication of administrative cases, protect-
ing the lawful rights and interests of citizens, legal persons and other organiza-
tions, and upholding and inspecting the exercise of administrative power in ac-
cordance with law by administrative organs” (Art. 1). 
Last but not least, it is important to take into due consideration the laws gov-
erning the legal professions, i.e. the 1996 Lawyers Law (amended in 2001 and 
2007) and the 1995 Judges Law (amended in 2001), enacted to enhance quality 
in these professions.14 In particular, these legal reforms affected the status of 
the judiciary. Where legislation is vague and flexible, the judiciary can be con-
sidered of great importance in defending people’s rights, if they have proper 
experience. However, back in 1979 when the Organic Law of the People’s 
Courts was enacted, there was no requirement for a judge to possess any legal 
education. In 1995 the National People’s Congress adopted initial legislation 
strengthening judicial independence and judicial professionalism, but it was 
only in 2002 that the 2001 amendment of the Judges Law entered into force 
making the National Judicial Examination mandatory for those wanting to be-
come judges.15 The upgraded status of judges is also reflected in the change of 
the term used to refer to them. In the 1979 Law and its subsequent amend-
ments, judges used to be called shenpanyuan 审判员, which literally means a 
‘person in charge of a decision’, while the more recent term faguan 法官 has 
the more prestigious meaning of ‘an official of the law’ and was used for the 
first time in the 1995 Judges Law.  
The reform peaked with the introduction, as a result of the 1999 third Con-
stitutional amendment, of the rule-of-law principle (fazhi 法治) into the Chi-
nese context. Although its introduction could again be considered instrumental 
                                                                                                                                                     
Western models and principles. For example, an earlier Organic Law of the People’s 
Courts was enacted in 1950. 
13 In 1978 the third Constitution of the People’s Republic of China was adopted to 
mark the distance from the 1975 Constitution born under the Cultural Revolution. 
Nevertheless, major changes were made in 1982 with the adoption of the present 
Constitution. 
14 See the bilingual legislative and constitutional text available on <http://www.law 
infochina.com>. 
15 Article 12, Judges Law of the People’s Republic of China (1995, amended in 2001).  
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to economic growth, paving the way for the People’s Republic of China to fi-
nally become a member of the World Trade Organisation (WTO) in 2001 fol-
lowing fifteen years of negotiation, it is undoubtedly true that the central gov-
ernment was at least outlining some general principles apt to foster a rights-
based legal evolution.16 
The introduction of a socialist rule of law is not the only reason why 1999 
was a year of fundamental importance in China’s economic and legal devel-
opment. The same year saw the first of four 5-year judicial reform plans issued 
by the Supreme People’s Court. Those documents underline the key role of the 
central government in pushing forward these reforms, apparently intent on 
marking a dividing line distancing itself from the revolutionary past.17 
These documents also demonstrate central-level awareness of some of the 
main weaknesses of the legal system in general. Although the flexibility, 
vagueness, and sometimes inconsistency and overall weak implementation of 
these laws are undeniable, their enactment itself can be seen as an indication 
that the legal system was not a passive actor. The legal system foresaw the co-
existence of different elements, such as judicial independence on the one hand, 
and the nomenclature system for appointing judges on the other. However, the 
fact that law can be used for purposes that at times are at odds with the instru-
mental goals of the state did not mean that China was transitioning to a West-
ern-style rule of law. Core rule-of-law concepts such as treating like cases 
alike and predictability of the application of law are not fundamental concepts 
in the socialist rule of law introduced by China at the turn of the century.18 
These legal reform efforts saw many scholars thinking about unavoidable 
political reform. However, in a continuous interplay between formal and in-
formal institutions, and written legislation and its inconsistent implementation, 
the idea is now being reconsidered. As underlined in the book edited by Eliza-
beth J. Perry and Sebastian Heilmann, Mao’s invisible hand. The political 
foundations of adaptive governance in China, the keywords of China’s un-
precedented growth are political resilience and adaptability of governance. In 
their words, ‘political resilience’ refers to “the capacity of a system to experi-
ence and absorb shocks and disturbances while retaining essentially the same 
function, structure, feedbacks and therefore identity,” while ‘adaptability of 
                                                 
16 Dillon, N (2011) ‘Governing Civil Society: Adapting Revolutionary Methods to 
Serve Post-Communist Goals,’ in Heilmann and Perry, supra n 9 at 158. 
17 An English description of the first two plans, (1999-2003 and 2004-2008) can be 
found in Chen, J (2008) Chinese Law: Context and Transformation, Martinus 
Nijhoff Publishers, at 155 ss. An English translation of the third plan (2009-2013) is 
available at <http://www.lawinfochina.com>. 
18 Liebman A Return to Populist Legality? supra n 11 at 186-187. 
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governance’ refers to “the capacity of actors in a system to further resilience 
through their actions and interactions, intentionally or unintentionally.”19 
This situation on the one hand led to fast and apparently lasting economic 
growth, but also to a wider urban-rural gap facilitating corruption and local 
protectionism under the catchphrase ‘To get rich is glorious,’ without any sub-
stantial political reform. Generally speaking, China entered an “age of stat-
utes”20 – oriented towards the West yet in a context still dominated by the so-
cialist principles of democratic centralism and the leading role of the Chinese 
Communist Party, but it was instrumental in achieving economic growth. This 
pragmatism of legal reform in setting the stage for economic growth can be 
seen in the development of property law. 
4. The Evolution of Property Law in China  
4.1. The Scope of Property Law in China Before 1978 
Until the Kuomintang (or National Party) came into power, civil law, and 
therefore property rights, was traditionally left to rites and customary law ap-
plied within families, clans, or villages. After the collapse of the Empire in 
1911, the newly-founded Republic of China led by Sun-Yat-Sen became con-
vinced of the inadequacy of Chinese law following the stipulation of the Une-
qual Treaties as a consequence of the Opium Wars and the removal of Chinese 
jurisdiction under the extraterritoriality clauses, and therefore it perceived the 
need to modernise the country.  
The Republic of China and, as of 1927, the National Party started looking at 
Western legal traditions, with the result that the so-called six codes of the 
1930s, among them the civil law code, were mainly based on German law. 
However, the six codes remained in force for too short a period for their prin-
ciples to become enrooted in the Chinese context.21 The Kuomintang, in par-
ticular, focused its attention much more on the big cities and its policies had 
only a minimal influence on rural areas, thus greatly expanding the urban-rural 
gap. The lack of interest in peasant China ended in a debacle, with the Nation-
alists powerless against the Chinese Communist Party led by Mao Zedong. 
                                                 
19 Heilmann, S and Perry, EJ (eds) (2011) Mao’s Invisible Hand. The Political Foun-
dations of Adaptive Governance, supra n 9. 
20 The expression comes from Guido Calabresi’s book A Common Law for the Age of 
Statutes (1985), Harvard University Press. 
21 Muhlemann, G (2011) ‘China’s Multiple Legal Traditions. An Overview’ in To-
masek, M and Muhelmann, G (2011) Interpretation of Law in China – Roots and 
Perspectives, Karolinum Press, 43 at 68. 
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Mao was quick to understand the importance of the peasantry in the conquest 
of power, and easily gained their support for the revolutionary cause during the 
Long March. On 1 October 1949 Mao founded the People’s Republic of China 
(PRC). 
As far as property rights regarding land were concerned, one of Mao’s ma-
jor policy interventions came in 1958, when an experiment previously con-
fined to Henan province was replicated throughout China. This was the so-
called Great Leap Forward, under which the countryside was divided into 
communes. Each commune was made up of five thousand households, and “all 
would contribute to the commune according to the best of his or her ability and 
receive food and all the basic necessities of life in return.” The Chinese were 
deprived of their personal goods and their work was focused mainly on indus-
trial advancement. However, such a regime was not suited to agricultural pro-
duction, as can be seen from the resulting famine which caused thirty million 
deaths.22 Just as the attempt to bring industrialisation to the countryside was a 
failure, the attempt to send professionals and city-dwellers to the countryside 
“to learn from the peasants” in the following decade similarly failed. Mao’s 
idea of a Great (or Cultural) Revolution reducing the economic and cultural 
urban-rural gap turned out to be his second failure.23 
The end of the Cultural Revolution, conventionally established to have tak-
en place in 1976, the year of Mao’s death, is generally considered the end of an 
era, a turning point in the People’s Republic of China (PRC)’s history. In reali-
ty, principles already established, such as democratic centralism, the leading 
role of the Party, and public ownership as the basis of the socialist economy, 
remained pivotal even under the post-Mao leadership.24 It is therefore of inter-
est to look at how property rights evolved under such variegated and some-
times opposing circumstances. 
When Deng started to modernise the country and build a more reliable legal 
system, property rights could not be ignored. The main difficulties involved 
upholding fundamental socialist principles while at the same time promoting 
economic growth and opening the door to the rest of the world. Against the 
background of Mao’s failures (the Great Leap Forward and the Cultural Revo-
lution), the post-Maoist leadership shifted attention away from the rural areas 
to the coastal metropolises. This inevitably resulted in a further widening of 
the urban-rural gap over the years. Even though Deng Xiaoping was responsi-
                                                 
22 James, BW (2006-2007) ‘Expanding the Gap: How the Rural Property System Exac-
erbates China’s Urban-Rural Gap’ (20) Columbia Journal of Asian Law, 451 at 459-
460. 
23 Ibid. 
24 The preamble of the Chinese Constitution is in this sense emblematic. 
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ble for the de-collectivisation of urban areas, reversing the devastating and 
failed revolutionary reforms of the Great Leap Forward, the major benefits of 
his policies accrued to the coastal and richer cities and provinces, where so-
called Special Economic Zones (SEZ) were established. The new leadership 
thus shifted its sights from the countryside, the birthplace of the original 
Communist revolution, to the richest towns and provinces, the symbols of Chi-
na’s unprecedented economic growth. 
Together with this comprehensive development process, it is possible to no-
tice a specific reform process in the field of property law. In particular, under-
standing of how the Chinese legal reform was able to maintain the centrality of 
public and collective ownership while at the same time promoting extraordi-
nary economic growth can be inferred from both the Constitution (including its 
four amendments of 1988, 1993, 1999, and 2004) and Chinese legislation. 
4.2. Property and Reform of Constitutional Principles in China 
As far as constitutional principles are concerned, it can be argued that the 1982 
Constitution followed the same lines as the previous Maoist constitutional 
principles (1954, 1975), the centrality of public ownership being one of them.25 
In fact, when discussing property rights in China, public and collective owner-
ship is the starting point. Before its four amendments (1988, 1993, 1999, 
2004), the 1982 Constitution originally stated that  
“The basis of the socialist economic system of the People’s Republic of China is 
socialist public ownership of the means of production, namely, ownership by the 
whole people and collective ownership by the working people” (Art. 6), 
and the “state economy […] is the leading force in the national economy. The 
state ensures the consolidation and growth of the state economy” (Art. 7). 
Strict respect of these principles was hardly a way to foster the growth of Chi-
na’s gross national product (GNP). 
A chronological analysis of the constitutional amendments underlines the 
instrumentality of property rights in promoting economic growth, even if much 
effort was put into maintaining consistency with ideological principles. Since 
1988, the first seventeen articles of the 1982 Constitution have been subject to 
many changes. By comparing the original texts with the ensuing amendments, 
I will underline the most significant changes with regard to property.26 The 
                                                 
25 English translations of the 1954 and 1975 constitutions are available respectively at 
<http://e-chaupak.net/database/chicon/1954/1954ae.pdf> and <http://www.legg 
icinesi.it/view_doc.asp?docID=586>. 
26 The following paragraphs use the English translation of the 1982 Constitution and 
amendments available at <http://www.lawinfochina.com>. 
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evolution of the twice-modified (in 1988 and 2004) Article 10 is certainly sig-
nificant. The original article specified that “[l]and in the cities is owned by the 
state [and l]and in rural and suburban areas is owned by collectives” and ruled 
out the possibility of organisations and individuals appropriating, buying, sell-
ing or otherwise engaging in the transfer of land by unlawful means. However, 
the 1988 amendment not only allowed land to be leased but, more importantly, 
an additional paragraph explicitly declared that the right to use the land could 
be legally transferred as long as the interests of society and the public were not 
jeopardised.27 Developing the provision that “[t]he state may, in the public in-
terest, requisition land for its use in accordance with the law,” the 2004 
amendment added a certain amount of protection, stipulating that compensa-
tion was to be paid when expropriating or taking over land. 
Article 11 has similar pivotal importance. Its continuous development since 
1982 dealt with a further crucial subject: the ‘individual’28 economy of urban 
and rural working people. The centrality of this article is shown by the fact that 
it was modified by all the constitutional amendments but one, namely that of 
1993. Although antagonism to the word ‘private’ was still evident in the origi-
nal text, the 1988 amendment allowed the existence and development of a pri-
vate sector as a complement to the socialist public economy, but under state 
guidance, supervision, and control. As a result of the 1993 shift from a planned 
economy to a socialist market economy, Article 11 was again amended in 
1999, with the non-public sector of the economy being declared an important 
component of the socialist market economy under the guidance, supervision 
and control of the state. In 2004 the article was again amended, this time add-
ing that the State not only exercises control, supervision and guidance over the 
non-public sector of the economy, but also encourages and supports it. By and 
large, the private sector evolved over the years from being the strictly con-
trolled exception, via complementing the public economy, to finally becoming 
an important component encouraged and supported by the State itself. 
While the private sector was dealt with in three of the four constitutional 
amendments, another pivotal article, Article 6 on collective ownership, re-
mained basically untouched. In fact, in its current form it still states that the 
basis of the socialist economic system is socialist public ownership, but to jus-
tify the aforementioned evolution of the ‘non-public economy’ in 1999 a para-
                                                 
27 The texts of the constitutional amendments are available at <http://www.lawinfo 
china.com>; see also Mo Zhang (2008) ‘From Public to Private: The Newly Enacted 
Chinese Property Law and the Protection of Property Rights in China’ in (5) Berke-
ley Business Law Journal 317 at 336. 
28 At that time, hostility to the term ‘private’ was still present. The word ‘individual’ 
appears to be less politically compromising. 
 13
graph was added to clarify that  
“In the primary stage of socialism, the State upholds the basic economic system 
in which public ownership is dominant and diverse forms of ownership develop 
side by side, and keeps to the distribution system in which distribution accord-
ing to work is dominant and diverse modes of distribution coexist.” 
In 1990 the Interim Regulations of the People’s Republic of China Concerning 
the Assignment and Transfer of the Right to the Use of the State-owned Land 
in the Urban Areas were, in fact, issued as a way of promoting urban construc-
tion and economic development. The focus on urban land is also demonstrated 
by the Law on Urban Real Estate issued by the Standing Committee of the Na-
tional People’s Congress in 1995 (and amended in 2007) with the purpose of 
safeguarding the real estate market order and protecting the lawful rights and 
interests of real estate owners.29 
Although the cunning of the first constitutional amendment of 1988 al-
lowed meaningful outcomes in urban areas by permitting transfers of the valu-
able right to use land, it brought no such advantages to rural areas, where the 
legal owners of the land were the collectives and where the transfer of rural 
land designated to remain farmland brought much less profit. In this respect, 
Article 8 is of great importance. Its original wording still envisaged collective 
ownership by the working people as part of the socialist economy, giving 
working members of rural economic collectives the right to farm plots of 
cropland and hilly land for their private use. In particular, collective ownership 
covered rural people’s communes, agricultural cooperatives and other forms of 
cooperative economy. In 1993 the so-called household responsibility system 
(HRS) in rural areas was officially included in the constitutional provisions 
(even though it was already amply used in practice during the 1980s), with the 
household contract becoming its main form. In 1999 the article was again 
modified to now state that rural collective economic organisations apply a dual 
system characterised by a combination of centralised and decentralised opera-
tions on the basis of a household operating contract. 
In view of the fact that Chinese constitutional principles are not directly ap-
plicable and enforceable, it is also necessary to take a quick look at the rele-
vant legislation.30 Constitutional principles become applicable and enforceable 
when enshrined in ordinary laws, although it should also be pointed out that in 
many cases constitutional amendments are the result of previous experimenta-
                                                 
29 Law of the People’s Republic of China on Urban Real Estate Administration, issue 
by the Standing Committee of the National People’s Congress (1995, amended in 
2007) English translation available at: www.lawinfochina.com. 
30 For the development of the Chinese constitutionalism, see Balme, S and Dowdle, 
MW (eds) (2009) Building Constitutionalism in China, Palgrave Mcmillan. 
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tions. 
4.3 Legislative Reform of Property Law 
The 1986 General Principles of Civil Law are the first laws in which a more 
general doctrine of property rights is to be found. Regarding goods, citizens 
are only allowed to personally own consumer goods, while the means of pro-
duction are owned by the state or other collective organisations. As a socialist 
country, China incorporated the socialist definition of goods centred on their 
economic function.31 Regarding land, the household responsibility system, en-
shrined in 1993 in the Constitution on account of its positive practical effect on 
agriculture, was reflected in legislation with the 1998 Land Administration 
Law (LAL), one of the aims of which was to provide real protection to culti-
vated land as a way of promoting the sustainable development of the socialist 
economy (Art 1). The system seemed to succeed for two main reasons. On the 
one hand, it allowed individual families to take care of ‘their’ land, while on 
the other hand the system gained legitimation through contracts, an instrument 
known and applied even in traditional China.32 
Notwithstanding the initial success of the system, several issues began to 
arise over the years, revealing its weaknesses. First, the right to use land was 
limited. Second, local government was allowed to redistribute the land in ac-
cordance with a village’s changing demographics, and, last but not least, there 
was an upsurge in the illegal practice of selling the right to use rural land for 
urban purposes for profit. The primacy of state ownership is mainly marked by 
the fact that rural land, if it is to be used for non-rural purposes, needs first to 
be converted into state-owned urban land through expropriation/re-
quisitioning.33 
The two main pieces of legislation enacted to protect household rights were 
the 1998 Land Administration Law and the 2002 Rural Land Contracting 
Law.34 The 1998 Land Administration Law sought to solve at least part of the 
problem by increasing land tenure to 30 years, thus stimulating long-term in-
                                                 
31 Epstein, EJ (1989) ‘The Theoretical System of Property Rights in China’s General 
Principles of Civil Law: Theoretical Controversy in the Drafting Process and Be-
yond’ in 52 Law and Contemporary Problems 177. 
32 Erie, MS (2007) ‘China’s (Post-) Socialist Property Rights Regime: Assessing the 
Impact of the Property Law on Illegal Land Takings’ in (37) Hong Kong Law Jour-
nal, 919 at 928. 
33 Id at 929. 
34 Ibid and James Expanding the Gap supra n 22 at 467 ss. Legislation available at 
<http://www.lawinfochina.com>. 
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vestment in the land peasant households used, establishing a contractual basis 
between the collective and the households in question, and clamping down on 
the illegal re-designation of land use. In line with this intention, the 2002 Rural 
Land Contracting Law attempted to stipulate the reciprocal rights and duties of 
the contractual parties to avoid land use re-designation (except in particular 
cases established ex lege) and to provide adequate compensation in cases of 
requisitioning.35 
The Law on the Contracting of Rural Land issued by the Standing Commit-
tee in 2002 to stabilise and perfect the previously mentioned dual system was 
enacted as a result of the third constitutional amendment and its changes to 
Article 8. Based on the household system of contracted responsibility for land 
under overall collective management, the law entitles peasants to a long-term 
and guaranteed right to the use of the land. The law can be seen as a further 
effort to improve the development of agriculture and the rural economy and to 
stabilise rural areas (Art. 1). This major effort is made clear in Article 25. The 
law’s drafters, conscious of the problems of corruption and local protection-
ism, banned state organs and government officials from taking advantage of 
their functions and powers to interfere in the conclusion, modification or ter-
mination of contracts for rural land. These praiseworthy efforts were not, how-
ever, sufficient. Implementation was limited, while on the other hand ongoing 
economic growth generated a huge exodus to the cities, in turn creating the 
need to quickly, and sometimes unlawfully, convert neighbouring rural areas 
into urban land through direct and informal agreements between the buyer and 
the seller, to the detriment of the peasants who, more often than not, found 
themselves without a place to stay, without compensation and until recently 
without a legal basis for protecting their rights. 
The need for a more comprehensive statute was perceived in 1993 with the 
official shift to a socialist market economy.36 Various experts worked on the 
                                                 
35 Ibid. Although these laws directly implement such constitutional principles as the 
possibility to transfer the right to use land, it is possible to find within their articles 
mechanisms only recently enshrined in the Constitution. One good example is the is-
sue of compensation. Even though Article 2 of the LAL was modified in 2004 to 
stipulate that when land is expropriated by the state for public interests, the state 
shall provide commensurate compensation, the original Article 47 of 1998 already 
listed in detail the cases and conditions under which compensation was to be calcu-
lated and paid. Furthermore, any dispute over the ownership of land or the right to its 
use is to be settled through consultation between the parties concerned; should con-
sultation fail, the dispute is to be dealt with by the people’s government at coun-
ty/township or a higher level, depending on the disputants, for instance whether they 
are legal entities or individuals. When the government’s decision is not accepted by 
the parties, the court system could be involved (art. 16, LAL). 
36 According to the second constitutional amendment (1993) article 15 now states that 
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new draft for fourteen years and the official result was the widely accepted 
2007 Real Rights Law. Even though it is often termed the Property Law,37 the 
Real Rights Law is a less misleading name. Bearing in mind the image of a 
jack-in-the-box, land can be owned by the state (urban land) or by a collective 
(rural land). Further clarifying the principle enshrined in the ‘living Constitu-
tion’ and aforementioned legislation articles, Article 42 of the Real Rights Law 
specifies that the state is allowed to requisition in the public interest collective-
ly-owned land and premises owned by legal entities and individuals. In both 
cases compensation must be paid. 
By and large, rural land could be expropriated in the public interest after 
consultation with the interested parties and upon payment of compensation, the 
amount of which is set in accordance with relevant legislation. 
Nevertheless, the Real Rights Law approved turned out to be a 247-article 
compromise which avoided addressing primary concerns and left room for 
vagueness and flexible solutions. “The standard for expropriation, the problem 
of demolishing homes, the language that failed to provide clear meanings of 
‘public interest’, ‘reasonable compensation’, the avoidance of the prescribed 
consultation, and ‘appropriate resettlement’ evoked the sharpest criticism.”38 
Although the 2007 Real Rights Law provided no solution to most of these 
problems, it does still have some intrinsic merits. The 2007 Law was wel-
comed for explicitly declaring the inviolability of private property rights. Its 
importance is demonstrated by the fact that different commissions worked on 
drafting it, with the fourteen years of debate preceding its enactment reflecting 
how relevant the subject was considered in the country.39 Inevitably, the public 
was involved, and thus another intrinsic merit of this law was that it raised le-
gal awareness among people. 
Not quoting Article 149 would prevent light being shed on one of the law’s 
major innovations. This article stipulates that the right to use construction land 
for building houses is to be automatically renewed upon expiration of the first 
50 years. It is currently too early to see how this provision will work in prac-
tice, but it will certainly be very interesting to track its future application. 
                                                                                                                                                     
‘The State practices a socialist market economy.’ 
37 Lawinfochina, an important database, for instance, uses the Property Law translation 
while Real Rights Law is more in line with the Chinese characters. 
38 Erie China’s (Post-) Socialist Property Rights Regime, supra n 32 at 933. 
39 Id at 932-940. 
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5. The Role of Courts in the Present Socio-Economic Context 
It has been observed that the reticent behaviour of the courts in solving proper-
ty disputes had various causes. The strict dependence of courts on the local 
people’s congress at different administrative levels naturally led to courts be-
ing involved in corruption and local protectionism. Not only was the appoint-
ment and dismissal of judges dependent on the legislative organs at different 
levels, but also their funding. Such circumstances can easily become an obsta-
cle to impartial and independent judicial judgments.40 
However, many scholars have pointed to the changes that have come with 
the legal and judicial reforms in the last ten years or so. This is backed up by 
the recent official narrative, which has again started stressing the importance 
of fundamental political principles. The appointment of Wang Shenjun (2008-
2013) as the President of the Supreme People’s Court, for instance, marked a 
clear break, distancing the judicial system from the previous President, Xiao 
Yang (2003-2007). Wang Shenjun was in fact more a politician than a judge, 
having worked previously in the police and lacking any formal legal education. 
In one of his speeches he made it clear that the courts should acknowledge first 
the supremacy of the Party, then the supremacy of popular interest, and finally 
the supremacy of the constitution and the law, in that particular order (the three 
supremacies). In so doing, courts should resist foreign influence, as their most 
important responsibility is to maintain social stability.41 
At the beginning of October 2012, the Provisions of the Supreme People’s 
Court came into effect. These deal with several issues concerning the handling 
of cases submitted to the people’s courts for the compulsory enforcement of 
compensation decisions following the expropriation of buildings on state-
owned land. Their purpose is to ensure the proper handling of such cases sub-
mitted by a city-level or county-level people’s government to a people’s 
court.42 If applied, these provision could partly mitigate the problem of local 
protectionism. Moreover, the Standing Committee of the National People’s 
Congress issued the Law on Mediation and Arbitration of Rural Land Con-
tracting Disputes in 2009 as a way of settling disputes over the contracted-out 
management of rural land in a timely and impartial manner, while at the same 
time maintaining the legitimate rights and interests of the parties concerned 
                                                 
40 Hawes, C (2006) ‘Improving the Quality of the Judiciary in China: Recent Reforms 
to the Procedures for Appointing, Promoting, and Discharging Judges’ in Russel, PH 
and Malleson, K (eds) (2006) Appointing Judges in an Age of Judicial Power: Criti-
cal Perspectives from Around the World, University of Toronto Press 395. 
41 Liebman A Return to Populist Legality? supra n 11 at 177-178. 
42 English translation available at <http://www.lawinfochina.com>. 
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and promoting rural economic development and social stability.43 
Turning attention to the judiciary, it could be of importance to stress that in 
2010 the Basic Standards of the PRC on Professional Ethics of Judges were 
issued, together with a new Code of Conduct for judges written by the Su-
preme Court. Although certain provisions sometimes appear trivial, they do 
reflect the growing status of the legal profession in the state administration.44 
Legislation would have minimal impact if not applied and enforced by the 
court system. This is the reason why the Chinese judiciary now has a great 
chance to show its improvements by using, within the limits of its powers pre-
scribed by law, all available room for manoeuvre. 
Judicial interpretations could, for instance, be an interesting instrument.45 
Their roots are to be found in the first years of the People’s Republic of China. 
Their legitimacy lies in a mandate issued by the Standing Committee, a legisla-
tive body first established in 1951. The mandate was restated in 1981 and after 
the Cultural Revolution included in Article 33 of the Organic Law of People’s 
Courts. A literal interpretation of the article leads to the conclusion that “spe-
cific application of laws and decrees in judicial proceedings” were to be the 
sole object of such Supreme People’s Court interpretations, but it is now gen-
erally accepted that a wide and variegated range of laws has been the object of 
such interpretations, with the latter now being considered para-legislative tools 
by courts and scholars alike. 
Notwithstanding the great perceived importance of the Real Rights Law, it 
has never been subjected to judicial interpretation. However, another instru-
ment that could be used in order to develop a more consistent context in the 
field of property law is the guiding case mechanism. This mechanism is a fair-
ly new instrument, and it involves the selection and re-issuing of Chinese court 
judgements to guide the adjudication of subsequent similar cases, with the aim 
of assuring the uniform application of the law throughout the country.46 In 
                                                 
43 English translation available at <http://www.lawinfochina.com>. 
44 Basic Standards of the PRC on Professional Ethics of Judges, promulgated by the Su-
preme People’s Court, 12 December 2010, and Code of Conduct for Judges promul-
gated by the Supreme People’s Court the same day. Available at Westlawchina. 
45 For an analysis see Dicks, AR ‘The Law Making Functions of the Chinese Judiciary: 
Filling holes in the Civil Law’ Reprinted from Edge, I (ed.) (2000) Comparative 
Law in Global Perspective: Essay in Celebration of the Fiftieth Anniversary of the 
Founding of the SOAS Law Department, Transnational Publications Inc. 
46 For more details, see the Chinese Guiding Case project of the Stanford Law School. 
See also Jin Zhenbao (2011) ‘Judicial Interpretation and Envisaged Guiding Case 
Mechanism in Mainland China’ in Tomasek and Muhelmann, Interpretation of Law 
in China, supra n 24 at 143; and Ahl, B (2014) ‘Retaining Judicial Professionalism: 
The New Case Guiding Mechanism of the Supreme People’s Court of China’ in 
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2002 several Chinese provinces started experimenting with this mechanism 
within their jurisdictions. Given its positive results, it was presented in 2005 
when the second 5-year judicial reform plan was officially announced by the 
SPC under the leadership of the Supreme Court President Wang. The rules re-
garding this mechanism were issued in 2010. On 20 December 2011, the first 
set of guiding cases was issued. The third set of cases contains a guiding case 
involving property law. This deals with a case of embezzlement, in which an 
official takes advantage of his position to obtain land use rights by fraud. 
Reading the People v. Yang Yanhu et al. case, compensation and relocation are 
obvious consequences. Further guiding cases on appropriate compensation and 
on the public interest content are now eagerly awaited.47 
Ever since its announcement, scholars have been developing different theo-
ries on this new instrument. Some, for instance, have argued that the mecha-
nism could function as a useful tool to control a judge’s interpretative leeway. 
However, China does not officially declare legal interpretation as a corollary 
function of judicial power. The lack of widespread recognition of the power to 
interpret the law by the Chinese judiciary entails a lack of statutory interpreta-
tion rules. In other words, the Chinese constitutional structure implies that the 
law should be applied without any interpretation (bouche de la loi). Neverthe-
less, it is generally acknowledged that all Chinese judges do actually interpret 
the law and their decisions are therefore suitable to provide guidance on how 
to decide similar cases. Other scholars have pointed out that this mechanism is 
in reality an attempt to improve judicial professionalism by leaving more room 
for discussion and comparison among the Chinese judiciary.48 
The lack of a clear binding effect as far as the guiding cases are concerned 
is not surprising, at least in the so-called civil law countries. If the aim of the 
mechanism is a better judiciary and a correct and uniform application of law 
throughout the country, then the persuasive force of such decisions could be 
sufficient. Accordingly, a judge would not be impeached for ignoring a guid-
ing case, although in doing so his choice would be open to possible criticism 
from judges and scholars. 
The selected cases are, in fact, published and made available to  
“strengthen the consciousness of using guiding cases and properly hear similar 
cases in light of advanced judicial concepts, fair adjudication yardsticks and 
scientific trial methods […] so as to further improve the quality and attach great 
                                                                                                                                                     
(217) The China Quarterly 121. 
47 The People v. Yang Yanhu et al. Case available at <http://www.lawinfo 
china.com>. 
48 Jin Zhenbao Judicial Interpretation and Envisaged Guiding Case Mechanism at 143 
and ss and Ahl, Retaining Judicial Professionalism supra n 46. 
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importance to case guidance […] and underscore the directive function of pub-
lic opinions.”49  
If an increasingly professional judiciary can learn how to deal with and use this 
mechanism, the judicial function could become more transparent, decisions 
more coherent and the law more predictable.50 
Judicial professionalism and legal culture are assuming great importance as 
a necessary premise for heightened judicial competence, and a well-
functioning judiciary will improve the Chinese people’s trust in the court sys-
tem, while at the same time allowing a constructive dialogue with the central 
government. This in turn could provide not only better protection of Chinese 
civil rights but also the possibility for the country to see stability and legality 
progressing hand in hand. Furthermore, channelling disputes to the courts will 
allow the central government and the CCP itself to monitor and better under-
stand people’s needs, and therefore increase popular consent for their policies. 
A stronger judiciary could also allow the development of interpretations of 
the vague term ‘public interest.’ Scholars have underlined that the lack of a 
definition of what constitutes public interest is a weak point in the Chinese 
property rights system and therefore it is unclear which interpretation covers 
land expropriation.51 Any comparative analysis would show that many West-
ern countries similarly lack such a definition as it can be expected to change 
with societal and political developments.52 
When people consider legal rules to be just and fair, and a judge’s authori-
tative judicial interpretation is able to fill the gaps in what the law does not 
say, a virtuous circle can be established. In this way, the CCP will undoubtedly 
be able to better monitor or address people’s grievances when channelled into 
the court system. Certainly, it will also have to solve the problem of com-
plaints due to misguided actions by central or local government. 
                                                 
49 Notice of the Supreme People’s Court on issuing the First Set of Guiding Cases, 20 
December 2011, available at <http://en.pkulaw.cn/display.aspx?id=9126&lib=law& 
SearchKeyword=guidingcases&SearchCKeyword=>. 
50 The use of the mechanism in practice will show its reach and how it fits in with other 
mechanisms such as the retrial system. The latter opens up the possibility of re-
deciding a ‘definitive’ case even against the parties’ interest and is anything but a 
mechanism to achieve legal certainty and predictability. 
51 James Expanding the Gap, supra n 22 at 478. 
52 Ibid. 
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6. Conclusions 
The first decades of legal reform have distanced China from its revolutionary 
period. However, unprecedented economic growth has also generated negative 
effects, such as corruption and legal protectionism. It seems plausible that in 
the wake of the 2008 world financial crisis, China (re)gained confidence in its 
historical tradition and started to be even more proud of the uniqueness of its 
development model, strongly avoiding the need to copy from the West. Never-
theless, this did not necessarily entail a return to the past. The principles and 
reforms adopted with the aim of building a more comprehensive and trustwor-
thy legal system are still effective. 
Many scholars point out that illegal land-grabbing is currently the primary 
cause of widespread violence in rural areas.53 The fact that peasant unrest be-
gan after legal consciousness rose in the country can be seen as an indication 
that Western concepts such as rule of law, while adapted to the Chinese con-
text, cannot be considered useless or meaningless. 
Despite the different context, but nevertheless with an intrinsically similar 
meaning, the hoisting of the constitutional flag over the roof of a Chongqing 
‘nail house’ – a house whose occupant refused to move out to make way for 
development – is further evidence of the growing extent of the people’s legal 
awareness. And at the end of November 2012, a similar image gained popu-
larity – that of a Wenling house demolished at the beginning of December 
2012.54 
Stability requires respect for private property (for instance houses built on 
collective and state land) and for real rights such as land use rights. It is inter-
esting to note that legislation, legal opinions and comments from the central 
institutions show the central government’s awareness of such problems and its 
will to solve them. Among the most relevant documents are the Certain Opin-
ions of the Central Committee of the Chinese Communist Party [and the] State 
Council on promoting the stable development of agriculture and continuing to 
increase farmers’ income in 2009.55 The document underlines the Chinese 
                                                 
53 Erie China’s (Post-) Socialist Property Rights Regime, supra n 32; Upham Chinese 
Property Rights and Property Theory supra n 4; Xiaolin Guo (2001) ‘Land Expro-
priation and Rural Conflict in China’ in The China Quarterly, 422; Pils, E (2005-
2006) ‘Land Disputes, Rights Assertion, and Social Unrest in China: A Case from 
Sichuan’ in (19) Columbia Journal of Asian Law 235. 
54 Pictures of such ‘nail houses’ can easily be found on the web. 
55 English translation available: Damm-Luhr, T (2010) ‘Certain Opinions of the Cen-
tral Committee of the Chinese Communist Party [and the] State Council on promot-
ing the stable development of agriculture and continuing to increase farmers’ income 
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need for self-reliance and the need to expand domestic demand in the country-
side.56 
Due to the key social function of property rights, the government is serious-
ly threatened by peasant unrest. With peasants representing the main working 
force, support and protection of agriculture should not just be a means of alle-
viating the pains caused by rapid economic growth, but, in the long run, could 
also be a means of making the economy grow in a more sustainable way, with 
the rural population participating in economic growth instead of being threat-
ened by it. Peasants have the potential to become productive agents in China’s 
ongoing economic modernisation. The role of the courts in this context might 
become crucial in giving some tangible voice to protest and in making the 
government listen to the groundswell peasant protest. Grievances, if expressed 
within the judicial system, can encourage the courts to use tools such as judi-
cial interpretation and the guiding case mechanism, eventually defining the 
public interest by respecting individual interests in a way compatible with 
competing individual interests.  
 
 
                                                                                                                                                     
in 2009’ in (19) Pacific Rim Law & Policy Journal, 103. 
56 Id. at 105. 
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